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Abstract
This paper implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of
equilibrium profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to
recruit, and defenders choose which demographic types to search. Some types are
more reliable than others in the sense of having a higher probability of carrying
out a successful attack if they get past the security checkpoint. In a Nash
equilibrium, defenders tend to profile by searching the more reliable attacker
types more frequently, whereas the attackers tend to send less reliable types. Data
from laboratory experiments with financially motivated human subjects are
consistent with the qualitative patterns predicted by theory. However, we also find
several interesting behavioral deviations from the theory.
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1. Introduction
An important problem facing security personnel is to identify terrorists within large
groups of mostly innocent people. This problem arises at checkpoints of all kinds, such as
roadblocks, permanent checkpoints between different regions or countries and airport security
counters. In such settings, large numbers of people pass through a screening process designed to
detect and detain terrorists. Typically, the volume of traffic in comparison with the number of
potential terrorists is so large that it is neither economically nor politically sensible to screen
everyone with the intensity required to detect a terrorist. The security personnel, therefore, face
the difficult task of deciding whom to take out of line and subject to greater scrutiny when there
are many innocent people and few terrorists. For instance, this issue was faced at U.S. military
checkpoints that attempted to secure the Green Zone in Baghdad during the U.S. occupation, and
it is also faced daily at busy airports, especially during periods of high security alert.
The problem is compounded by the fact that a terrorist group may be strategic in the
sense of being able to respond quickly to any targeted screening program. If the government
screens one category that is closely associated with the terrorist group (for instance, young men
from a certain province in the Iraq case), then the terrorist group faces a strong incentive to begin
recruiting and sending people outside that category, for example, women. The government
would then rationally respond by searching women, at least to some extent. The equilibrium
outcome of this interaction is unclear. Some argue for a completely random search process, but
that would give the terrorists an incentive to send only their core supporters, since they would be
no more likely to be searched than anyone else, and these core supporters would presumably be
more likely to carry out a successful attack if not searched. There is a need for careful analysis to
determine what kind of search strategy is rational, implementable and efficient in an environment
with threats that evolve in response to securities measures.
Profiling occurs when a certain characteristic or signal, such as race or ethnicity, is used
to decide who to subject to a more intrusive investigation. Racial profiling, for instance, is based
on the belief that certain crimes are committed disproportionately by the members of a particular
race. The scholarly debate in the social science literature is mostly focused on whether profiling
occurs and whether it is effective, rather than on normative and constitutional issues. Profiling is
not per se illegal in most countries, and legal scholars have discussed the pros and cons of
various types of profiling and the circumstances under which it might be justified (Barnes and
2

Gross, 2002; Ellmann, 2003).1 Economists have studied racial profiling issues from the
perspective of whether profiling is a rational use of limited enforcement assets. A recent
literature pioneered by Knowles, Persico and Todd (2001) has characterized the Nash
equilibrium of a simultaneous move game between the police and a specific group of the
population, such as motorists/drivers, who may commit a crime. The police objective is to
minimize crime when deciding which vehicles to search, while motorists choose whether to carry
contraband or not. The equilibrium involves unequal investigation rates across different
demographic groups, even if police officers are unbiased, as long as the members of one group
incur higher costs of carrying contraband than those of another group. In this sense, profiling can
result from a type of rational experienced-based or “statistical” discrimination. Antonovics and
Knights (2009) point out that if statistical discrimination alone is used to explain differences in
the rates at which vehicles of drivers of different races are searched, then these search decisions
should be independent of police officers’ own race. They test this prediction using data from the
Boston Police Department and find that officers are more likely to conduct a search if the race of
the officer differs from the race of the driver.
The debate on profiling significantly changed after the terrorist attacks of September
11th, 2001. Screening procedures have included different versions of the Computer Assisted
Passenger Prescreening System (CAPPS) and the Secure Flight Passenger Screening Program, a
computerized tool to select passengers for screening, and more recently the full body image
scanning. Passengers with elevated ratings according to these mechanisms are selected for
additional searches and for baggage inspection, while some other passengers are still searched at
random. If previously the discussion was about whether demographic profiling was happening,
after 9/11 researchers and politicians have focused on the conditions under which such profiling
is acceptable, either constitutionally or as a policy matter. All screening and profiling
mechanisms have encountered criticisms and often legal actions. Computerized searching
mechanisms are often accused of inducing racial or religious profiling and discrimination. In

1

In Protecting Liberty in an Age of Terror, Heymann and Kayyem (2005) discuss the tension between avoiding past
abuses of profiling and the need to confront high-stakes threats. They suggest more reliance on nationality-based
profiling, as opposed to pure racial profiling. Barak-Erez (2007) offers an effects-based consideration: if profiling
really is necessary, then it should be used more often in situations in which it is less likely to have a long-lasting
effect on the lives of those being profiled. Harcourt (2007) provides a thoughtful discussion of the unintended
consequences of profiling, such as the tendency for “false positive” searches to induce more terrorism.
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fact, there is a debate among experts about whether profiling strategies are more effective than
pure random searches.
Several years ago, on November 22, 2010, National Public Radio held an Oxford-style
debate at New York University with the two teams arguing the motion “Should U.S. Airports
Use Racial and Religious Profiling?” Advocates of the motion supported the use of profiling
specifically concentrating on young fundamentalist Muslim males from the Middle East, as the
majority of recent terrorist attacks have been associated with this type of individual. Opponents
argued that profiling just invites terrorist groups to recruit agents who do not fit the profile. Bin
Laden himself, in his hand-written journals, “exhorted followers to explore ways to recruit nonMuslims … – particularly African Americans and Latinos” (the New York Times, 5/12/2011).
This paper contributes to this debate by providing theoretical analysis and experimental
validation to guide policy makers to improve the effectiveness of targeted and/or profiled
screening. Our research investigates the conditions under which profiling is a rational and
efficient counterterrorism policy. Although our work is related to the previous economic
literature, we take a somewhat different approach by assuming that the terrorist group rationally
chooses individuals with certain characteristics to carry out its attacks, rather than viewing
terrorism as the result of decentralized individual choices. In the model, the terrorist group
(attacker) decides which demographic “type” to send through a security checkpoint. The security
officials (defender) decide which type or category to subject to an extensive search. Some types
(for instance, young males with military and ideological training) are more “reliable” than others
(women and children) in the sense of having a higher probability of mounting a successful attack
once they pass undetected through a security checkpoint. If the attackers were not selective,
sending a mix of types with equal probabilities, then defenders would use limited resources to
search the most reliable types who would cause the greatest damage if they passed security.
Consequently, attackers would respond by sending less reliable types more often. In turn,
defenders would respond by defending less reliable types more often. In equilibrium, attackers
and defenders should not have any additional incentive to change their strategies. We show that,
in a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium, there is a tendency to use low-reliability attack strategies
and high-reliability defense strategies. Thus, attack and defense strategic patterns are seemingly
“misaligned,” even though both players are rational and there are no surprises in terms of
observed behavior.
4

Our profiling game is similar in spirit to a 2-person “hide-and-seek” game in which the
Hider decides where to place an object and the Seeker decides which of n locations to search.
The Hider wins if the locations do not match, and the standard zero-sum version of this game has
(Hider, Seeker) payoffs of (1, 0) if the location decisions do not match and (0, 1) otherwise.2 Our
profiling game is similar in that the defender desires to match by searching the demographic type
selected by the attacker, who in turn desires to select a type that does not match. However, our
profiling game is different in that the different demographic “types” are assumed to have
different success or “reliability” probabilities, an asymmetry that introduces asymmetries in the
attack and defense probabilities across attacker reliability types. As a result, in some cases, only
a subset of reliability categories are actually used in equilibrium, and within this subset the
defense probabilities and the terrorists’ attack probabilities are inversely related, with the
government searching less reliable types less frequently and the terrorists sending them more
frequently.
With only two locations, hide-and-seek games are sometimes referred to as “matching
pennies” games, and such games have been used to analyze strategic play in professional sports
contests, e.g. whether to pass or lob in tennis or to which side of the goal to direct a penalty kick
or defense (Chiappori, Levitt and Groseclose, 2002). Matching pennies games have also been
used to model predator-prey interactions, where the predator desires the match. These games are
structured to be realistic for the biological applications considered, and payoffs can be stochastic.
For example, the Avrahami, Güth and Kareev (2005) “parasite game” is a hide-and-seek game
preceded by a move by “nature” that randomly determines which of two locations will have a
food resource. The “producer” selects a location to look for food and harvests if it is present. The
“parasite” then selects a location to search, in order to steal the food if it has been harvested by
the producer. Our profiling model also has stochastic payoffs, but the focus is on a monotonic
array of reliability parameters for a set of possible attacker types, and on the monotonic arrays of
attack and defense probabilities that can extend to n-categories or types.

2

These payoffs are used for the 4-location version of the hide-and-seek game examined by Rubinstein, Tversky and
Heller (1996). In the experiment the locations were arrayed along a line and the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for
this symmetric game involved equal hide and seek probabilities of 0.25 for each location. The results of the
experiment showed that subjects select endpoint locations somewhat less frequently than the middle locations.
Crawford and Iriberri (2007) reconsider the Rubinstein, Tversky and Heller data and conclude that a model of levels
of strategic thinking (“level-k”) can explain the observed patterns when subjects have psychological aversions and
attractions to endpoints. We will discuss the level-k analysis further in the results section below.
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We use an experiment to assess the extent to which individual decisions are consistent
with theoretical predictions of misaligned profiling. The experiments are motivated, in part, by
the somewhat counter-intuitive nature of equilibrium patterns of the randomized strategies. In
particular, the theory produces a paradox of misaligned profiling: in equilibrium the high
reliability categories are searched more intensively, even though they are used less intensively by
the terrorist organization. Field experiments with “professional” terrorists and security officials
to test these predictions would be expensive and controversial, if possible at all, and the results
would surely be confidential. Instead, we rely on laboratory experiments, which provide the
ability to replicate and control the environment, even though the laboratory environment is
admittedly highly simplified. The results of the experiment reveal behavioral patterns that are
consistent with predicted patterns. However, we also find several interesting behavioral
deviations, with defenders tending to search more reliable attacker types more often than
predicted.

2. Theoretical Model and Predictions
To address the problem of profiling consider a simple two-player model of screening at
security checkpoints. The first player represents a government agency that is attempting to
discover terrorists, e.g., military officers at a checkpoint, Transportation Security Agency
officials at an airport security counter, or other agencies dealing with homeland defense, such as
the Coast Guard, the Border Patrol, the Customs Service, or the Immigration and Custom
Enforcement department of the Department of Homeland Security. Their objective is to identify
any terrorists attempting to penetrate their checkpoint and, thereby, block an attack. The second
player represents a terrorist group, which is assumed to be centrally directed, strategically
rational, and motivated by a desire to penetrate the defenses and commit an attack. Experts agree
that there is usually a strategy behind terrorists’ actions. Whatever form it takes, terrorism is
typically not random, or blind; it is a deliberate use of violence against civilians for political or
religious reasons. Therefore, following the spirit of most game theoretic literature on terrorism,
we model terrorists as rational actors; for an excellent survey, see Sandler and Arce (2007).3 In

3

Our models of strategic terrorism can be modified in a straightforward manner to include the possibility of
exogenous, decentralized sources of terrorism of the emotional or “home-grown” variety.
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what follows, we will refer interchangeably to the terrorist as the “attacker” and to the
government agency as the “defender.”
The main motivation for our research can be illustrated with a simple model taken from
Kydd (2011). The population of individuals passing through the checkpoint is divided into n ≥ 2
different observed categories or types. A successful attack by a person from any category will
result in a gain of G for the terrorist and a loss of L for the government security agency. In what
follows, we will refer interchangeably to terrorists as “Attackers” and to the government agency
as the “Defender.” Let the n categories be indexed by i, where the lower the value of i, the higher
the chances an undetected person would succeed in carrying out the attack. The probability that a
person from category i will succeed if undetected is denoted by ri, with r1 > r2 > r3 > … > rn. We
will refer to ri as the “reliability” of category i. Each category could be identified and determined
by different criteria, such as age, gender, and country or region of origin, religion, or any other
observable personal characteristic. For instance, the New York Times on June 27, 2011 reported
that in a remote area in central Afghanistan “insurgents tricked an 8-year-old girl … into
carrying a bomb wrapped in cloth that they detonated remotely when she was close to the police
vehicle.” This is an example of an attack using a person from a less reliable type or category who
is less likely to be searched.4
We assume that the defender selects one category to search, and that the search is fully
effective in detecting the attacker.5 Hence, the attacker of type i who is searched would fail, and
one who is not searched would carry out an attack with probability of success ri. Let di denote the
probability of defending against type i, and let ai denote the probability of attacking with type i,
with 0 < di, ai ≤ 1. Then, a person from category i would succeed only if the defender searches
another type and the attack turns out to be successful, an outcome that occurs with probability (1di)ri. The attacker, therefore, faces a tradeoff between sending high reliability people and sending
others who are less likely to be searched. If the attacker uses type i with probability ai, then the
defender’s probability of a loss from defending against type i is (1-ai) times the average
reliability across all other types.
4

To be clear, there is heterogeneity within a category, and the “reliability” of a category represents the average
effectiveness of the best people in that category who can be successfully identified, recruited and trained, i.e., the
“tail” of the distribution in terms of physical and emotional fitness, willingness to risk extreme injury or death,
unwavering loyalty to the cause, and the ability to mask emotions and improvise to defeat unanticipated challenges.
5
This assumption, used in Kydd (2011) and Basuchoudhary and Razzolini (2006), can be generalized to derive
comparative statics predictions for an improvement in search technology (see Holt, Kydd, Razzolini and Sheremeta,
2011).
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Before deriving the equilibrium, it is useful to provide some intuition. The equilibrium
involves randomization, since a deterministic attack via one type would lead to a sure defense
there, and a deterministic defense against one type would lead to a sure attack via another. In
equilibrium with randomization, the expected payoffs for all decisions used must be equal,
otherwise the player would prefer decisions with higher expected payoffs. The main result
reveals a paradox of misaligned profiling: in equilibrium the high reliability types are searched
more intensively, even though they are used less intensively by the terrorist organization. This is
a paradox in the sense that the equilibrium pattern makes the defense strategy appear to be
misguided, and hence, ineffective, which is not the case. Second, there will be a cutoff point
beyond which the defender will not bother searching at all, so types with a low reliability score
will be ignored and not searched. Third, the attack probabilities will actually increase as the
category’s reliability declines, up to a cutoff point, after which the probabilities will decline to
zero. That is, a set of low reliability categories will not be recruited by the attacker nor searched
by the defender. Within the set of higher reliability categories, the defense probabilities and the
terrorists’ attack probabilities will be inversely related, with the government searching less
reliable categories less frequently and the terrorists sending them more frequently.
The key structural feature of our model is the difference in attack success reliabilities for
different attacker types. The increasing probabilities of success of increasingly reliable attacker
types introduce a stochastic element into the payoff functions, which differentiates our model
from standard hide and seek games in which the person doing the hiding will win with
probability 1 if the seeker looks elsewhere. In our model, the monotonic ranking of attacker type
reliabilities generates misaligned, monotonic attack and defense profiles, with defense
probabilities increasing in attacker type reliability, and with attack probabilities inversely related
to reliability, at least for the range of attacker types that are actually used with positive
probability in equilibrium. The n-dimensional nature of the attack and defense decisions also
differentiates our model from other games with stochastic payoff elements, such as penalty kicks
games in soccer where the kick can go to one side or the other, or a two-player food search game
with two locations.6 In particular, the attack and defense probability predictions for the n6

See Chiappori, Levitt and Groseclose (2002) for a discussion of the penalty kicks in soccer and evidence that
patterns of penalty kicks for two European soccer leagues correspond to qualitative predictions of a mixed-strategy
Nash equilibrium. The Avrahami, Güth and Kareev (2005) parasite game discussed earlier is another game with two
locations and with probabilistic outcomes. If the producer and parasite search the same location, then the parasite
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dimensional profiling model we consider are shown to be monotonic in the ranked reliability
parameters and to be inversely related or misaligned.
The intuition behind misaligned profiling is surprisingly simple. An attacker choosing
between n different reliability types would have an expected payoff of G(1-di)ri from selecting
type i. It must be the case that these attacker expected payoffs are equal for all types that are used
with positive probability in equilibrium; that is, G(1-di)ri = πa, where πa is the attacker payoff in
equilibrium. Since the right side of the equation is a constant with respect to i, the inverse
relationship between di and ri on the left makes it clear that that attacker types with higher
reliability are defended with higher probabilities. An analogous argument can be constructed
from equating defender expected payoffs and removing terms in sums that cancel out, to show
that attack success probabilities are equalized: airi = ajrj for all types i, j used with positive
probability, and hence, attack probabilities and associated type reliabilities are inversely related
in equilibrium.
These results can be illustrated for the special case of a two-category zero-sum game, in
which a successful attack results in payoffs of 1 for the attacker and -1 for the defender. To be
willing to randomize, the attacker’s expected payoff for sending either type must be equal, i.e.,
the product of the probabilities of not being searched and of succeeding are the same for both
categories: (1-d1)r1 = (1-d2)r2. Since 1-d2 = d1, we obtain a single equation, (1-d1)r1 = d1r2, which
can be solved for defense probability against type 1:
Defense probability against type 1: d1 = r1/(r1+r2).
Since type 1 is more reliable, r1 > r2, it follows that d1 > d2, or the defender searches the more
reliable type 1 more often, which is intuitive.7 Conversely, for any given attack probabilities a1
and a2, a defense against type 1 will result in a loss with probability a2r2 whereas a defense
against type 2 will result in a loss with probability a1r1. Since a2 = 1-a1, the equality of expected
defender payoffs results in an equation, (1-a1)r2 = a1r1, which can be solved for the attack
probability via type 1:
Attack probability via type 1: a1 = r2/(r1+r2).
takes the food resource from the producer, and if not, the producer keeps the food. This game has a non-constant
sum structure, since sites that are more likely to contain food offer a higher payoff sum for producer and parasite.
Our profiling game is, on the other hand, a constant sum game.
7
The use of expected payoffs implicitly assumes risk neutrality, but a reformulation in terms of expected utility
yields the same monotonicity, since the attacker’s expected utility would still be decreasing in di and increasing in ri,
so equating expected payoffs would still imply that high reliability types are searched more often.
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Hence the counter-intuitive result that a1 < a2; that is, in equilibrium, the attacker uses the more
reliable type 1 less often, since r2 < r1.8, 9

3. Experimental Design and Procedures
Our objective is to evaluate the extent to which observed behavior is consistent with
theoretical predictions. To this end, we design two treatments with (r1 = 0.67, r2 = 0.33) and (r1 =
0.80, r2 = 0.20). For simplicity, we selected reliability parameters that sum to 1 in both
treatments: r1+r2 = 1. In the 67/33 treatment, type 1 is twice as reliable as type 2. Theoretical
prediction is that the defender searches type 1 with probability d1 = 2/3 and the attacker uses type
1 with probability a1 = 1/3. Conversely, the probability of defense against type 2 is d2 = 1/3 and
the probability of attack via type 2 is a2 = 2/3. The best-response functions for this game are
shown in Figure 1.10 For example, if the probability of an attack via type 1 is low (left side), the
probability of a defense against type 1 is low (bottom left part of the figure). Conversely, if the
probability of defense against type 1 is high (top), then the attacker will use type 1 with
probability 0 (upper left side). The intersection of the best response lines determines the
equilibrium, with a 2/3 probability of a defense against type 1, and a 1/3 probability of an attack
via type 1.
In the 80/20 treatment, we increase the reliability of type 1 so that type 1 is four times
more reliable than type 2, i.e., r1 = 0.80 and r2 = 0.20. The prediction of the theory is that since
type 1 is more reliable, the probability of defense against type 1 should increase to d1 = 4/5,
while the probability of attack via type 1 should decrease to a1 = 1/5. Correspondingly, the
probability of defense against type 2 should decrease to d2 = 1/5, while the probability of attack
via type 2 should increase to a2 = 4/5.

8

Given the theoretical predictions about the defense and attack probabilities, the expected payoff of the attacker is
r1r2/(r1+r2) and the expected payoff of the defender is 1-r1r2/(r1+r2). If r1 = 2/3 and r2 = 1/3, for example, the attacker
and defender expected payoffs are 2/9 and 7/9. The equilibrium would not be altered if there were a third attack type
with r3 = 1/6, since a unilateral deviation to use this type would only provide a 1/6 expected payoff even though it is
undefended, which is less than the 2/9 payoff the attacker can expect using types 1 or 2 in equilibrium.
9
The general model with n categories is solved similarly by equating expected payoffs and rearranging terms.
Attack probabilities can be expressed as ratios of the reciprocals of the reliability parameters ai = (1/ri)/Σ(1/ri) for all
i that are used in equilibrium, and defense probabilities are di = [1-(s-δ)ai]/δ, where s is the number of categories
used in equilibrium, and δ is the probability of a successful defense, which is set equal to 1 in the experiment.
10
The best-response functions should actually have sharp corners, since perfectly rational players are assumed to
respond sharply to small differences in expected payoffs. The lines in the figure are plotted with a slight amount of
curvature to make it easier to visually separate the two best-response lines.
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Subjects for the experiment were recruited from student populations at the University of
Virginia, with the promise that they will “participate in a research experiment” and will receive a
fixed payment of $6 plus additional cash earnings, which will depend on their own and others’
decisions. When subjects arrived in the lab, they were seated in visually separated cubicles with
networked computers. The software kept track of total earnings, and subjects were paid in cash at
the end of each session, after they signed receipt forms. A total of 144 subjects participated in the
experiment with 72 subjects (36 pairs) participating in one treatment and 72 subjects (36 pairs)
participating in the other treatment. Instructions for the experiment are included in the Appendix.
The screen displays listed the most reliable category on the left side for half of the subject pairs,
and on the right side for the other half. The experiment was run in a series of sessions consisting
of 12 to 18 subjects each, with fixed pair matching for 50 rounds. Subjects in each pair were
given the role of attacker or defender and stayed in that role in all rounds of the experiment.
In each round, the attacker chose a category corresponding to a type of terrorist agent
(type 1 or type 2), and the defender chose a profiling strategy, or type of person to search. If the
selected categories matched then the attack failed. If the selected categories did not match, then
the attack success probability was determined by the reliability of the attacker’s category choice.
A successful attack resulted in a fixed payoff of 1 dollar to the attacker and a loss of 1 dollar for
the defender. The payoffs were added to private incomes of $1 for the defender and $0.60 for the
11

attacker in each round. These outside incomes were selected to equalize final payoffs and were
private information (defenders did not know attacker incomes, and vice versa). On average
subjects earned $26 and the experiment lasted for about 30 minutes.11

4. Results
Table 1 reports for the two treatments the predicted and average observed probabilities of
defense and attack for type 1, respectively from the first round, the second half and all 50 rounds
of play.
Table 1: Experimental Data and Predictions
Treatment
67/33
80/20
d1
a1
d1
a1
Predicted probabilities
0.67
0.33
0.80
0.20
1st round average data
0.81
0.36
0.92
0.19
2nd half average data
0.78
0.30
0.88
0.20
All rounds average data
0.79
0.31
0.88
0.22
We begin by analyzing the data from the 67/33 treatment. Figure 2 displays the average
defense and attack probabilities, while Figure 3 displays the average attack and defense
probabilities for each of the 36 fixed pairs. As predicted by the theory, there is strong
“misaligned profiling.” Specifically, the defenders search more reliable type 1 with higher
probability than less reliable type 2 (0.79 versus 0.21; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01,
n = 36).12 Conversely, the attackers employ more reliable type 1 with lower probability than less
reliable type 2 (0.31 versus 0.69; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01, n = 36).
Relative to theoretical point predictions, we find that defenders tend to defend against the
more reliable type 1 more than predicted (0.79 versus 0.67; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value <
0.01, n = 36). The behavior of attackers is not significantly different from theoretical predictions
for category 1 (0.31 versus 0.33; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value = 0.42, n = 36).

11

The data for all sessions are available on the web at: http://www.people.virginia.edu/~cah2k/profiling_data.htm.
The 10 sessions are numbered adn24-adn28, adn30, adnp1-adnp4. For each session, the data table provides links to a
graph of data averages for each round, a color-coded verbal/numerical summary of each attacker-defender
interaction, and a presentation of all data in column form, which was used to create an Excel data file for each
session (also included in the table).
12
In conducting statistical tests, we treat the average over all 50 rounds of the experiment by the same subject as one
observation. The results also hold if we analyze only the first round of the experiment and are available upon
request.
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One may argue that subjects in a role of defender search type 1 more often because this
option is presented to the left from type 2. In a related literature on multi-battle contests, called
Colonel Blotto games, where attackers and defenders allocate resources on multiple battlefields,
it is documented that subjects often exhibit allocation bias towards left battlefields (Chowdhury,
13

Kovenock and Sheremeta, 2013).13 Nevertheless, it is unlikely that allocation bias can explain
our data, since in half of the sessions type 1 option was presented to the left from type 2 and in
the other half it was presented to the right. Moreover, the probability that the defender searches
type 1 is virtually the same disregarding whether type 1 is located to the left or to the right of
type 2 (0.79 versus 0.79; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.72, n1 = n2 = 18).
The pattern of data that we observe in the 67/33 treatment is also observed in the 80/20
treatment with r1 = 0.80 and r2 = 0.20. Figures 4 and 5, displaying the average defense and attack
probabilities for the 80/20 treatment, show even stronger “misaligned profiling.” Specifically, the
defenders search more reliable type 1 with much higher probability than less reliable type 2 (0.88
versus 0.12; Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01, n = 36). Conversely, the attackers use
more reliable type 1 with much lower probability than less reliable type 2 (0.22 versus 0.78;
Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01, n = 36). As before, the defenders tend to defend
against the more reliable attacker type 1 more than predicted (0.88 versus 0.80; Wilcoxon
signed-rank test, p-value < 0.01, n = 36). This behavior cannot be explained by the allocation
bias, since the probability that the defender searches type 1 is very similar in sessions where type
1 is located to the left versus sessions where type 1 is located to the right of type 2 (0.86 versus
0.90; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.19, n1 = n2 = 18).
A comparative static prediction of the theory is that increasing reliability of type 1 should
increase the defense probability against this type. This is exactly what we observe in the
experiment. When the reliability of type 1 increased from r1 = 0.67 to r1 = 0.80, the defense
probability against type 1 increased from 0.79 to 0.88 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value < 0.01,
n1 = n2 = 36). The prediction for the attacker is the opposite, increasing reliability of type 1
should decrease the probability of using type 1. Again, we observe this in the experiment. When
the reliability of type 1 increased from r1 = 0.67 to r1 = 0.80, the probability of using type 1 by
the attacker decreased from 0.31 to 0.22 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.01, n1 = n2 = 36).
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For a comprehensive review of this literature see Dechenaux, Kovenock and Sheremeta (2014). The two most
relevant studies that investigate the behavior of attackers and defenders are Kovenock, Roberson and Sheremeta
(2010) and Deck and Sheremeta (2012). Both studies examine behavior in attacker-defender games, where the
defender needs to win all targets, while the attacker needs to win only one target to secure the prize.
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Although the data averages are close to Nash predictions for the two treatments, there is a
clear tendency for defenders to defend against the more reliable type more often than predicted
(the attackers’ behavior, on the other hand, is quite close to the Nash predictions). These
deviations from Nash predictions are not large in magnitude, but it is notable how the deviations
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are largely concentrated among defenders in both treatments. These deviations are in an intuitive
direction for defenders, who might find it natural to over-defend against high reliability attack
types, whereas the Nash prediction for attackers is less intuitive, i.e. attack more often with the
less reliable attacker type.14 Even if this strategy is less intuitive, it does show up in the very first
round of play, where it seems that attackers expect that defenses are more likely to be targeted to
more reliable attack types. One way to model such strategic thinking about what the other person
might do is to use a “level-k” analysis (Stahl and Wilson, 1994, 1995).15 After the initial round of
play in the experiment, however, a level-k analysis is less appropriate since subjects probably
learn more from their own experience than from introspection and levels of strategic thinking.
Moreover, a level-k analysis of best responses to level k-1 is the same for both of our treatments,
so this approach cannot explain the salient treatment effect in the data, an effect that is predicted
by the Nash equilibrium.
Another approach that we considered is the quantal response equilibrium (QRE)
introduced by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995), which in this case adds curvature to the sharp-line
best response function in Figures 1 and 2 and would tend to pull attack probabilities closer to 0.5.
Such a smoothing, however, could not explain the observation that attack probabilities are close
to Nash predictions, while the probability of defense of the high reliability type is even more
extreme than predicted. It is worth noting that the QRE has been useful in explaining “ownpayoff effects” in 2x2 matrix games (McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995; Goeree and Holt, 2001;
Goeree, Holt and Palfrey, 2003, 2005) with asymmetries that differ from those that arise in our
profiling model.16 One asymmetry in the profiling game used in our experiment is that an
attacker may feel some extra regret when a low-reliability attack type is used and is not defended
against, but fails anyway. Several subjects mentioned this type of reaction in an informal
14

We thank a referee for pointing this out.
Level-k thinking would imply that level-0 attackers randomly choose between types 1 and 2, and level-0
defenders randomly search type 1 and type 2, with equal frequency. In response to level-0 behavior, level-1
attackers should use type 1 and level-1 defenders search type 1. Similarly, in response to level-1 behavior, level-2
attackers should use type 2 and level-2 defenders should search type 1. Further switching occurs at higher levels, so
predictions would have to be based on estimated proportions of people at each level (see Crawford, Costa-Gomes
and Iriberri, 2013). But note that these predictions (and analogous predictions for higher levels) are the same for the
r = 0.67 and r = 0.80 treatments, in contrast with observed data patterns and Nash predictions.
16
An example of the type of payoff asymmetry for which QRE has been useful in the past would be adding an extra
cost for the attacker for training a low-reliability type. In a simple game with 2 reliability types, such change in the
attacker’s payoff function would affect the defense probabilities, while it would not affect the Nash attack
probability associated with either reliability type, since those probabilities are constructed so to keep the defender
indifferent between defense options. As noted previously, such “own-payoff effects” are observed in the data from
laboratory experiments and are well explained by QRE models.
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debriefing conversation after one of the sessions. Another possible approach to explaining
deviations from Nash predictions could involve probability weighting, e.g. a tendency to
overweight the relatively low probability (0.33 in equilibrium) of an attack with a reliable type
may cause the defender to “over-defend” against that type.17 While some of these approaches
seem plausible, we believe that any ex post explanation would be tenuous at best without
additional research.

6. Conclusions
This paper implements an experimental test of a game-theoretic model of equilibrium
profiling. Attackers choose a demographic “type” from which to recruit, and defenders choose
which demographic types to search. Some types are more reliable than others in the sense of
having a higher probability of carrying out a successful attack if they get past the security
checkpoint. Using a controlled laboratory experiment with financially motivated human subjects,
we find strong support for game-theoretic model of equilibrium profiling. Consistent with
theoretical predictions, the defenders search more reliable types with higher probability, while
the attackers employ more reliable types with lower probability than less reliable types.
However, we also find small (but systematic) deviations with defenders searching more reliable
types more often than predicted. These deviations, however, do not obscure the clear pattern of
misaligned profiling and the sharply different effects of attacker-type reliability parameters on
predicted and observed attack and defense propensities.
There are several important implications of our findings. The Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) in October 2010 issued the following statement: “As a precaution, DHS has
taken a number of steps to enhance security. [….] Passengers should continue to expect an
unpredictable mix of security layers that include explosives trace detection, advanced imaging
technology, canine teams and pat downs, among others.” As our theoretical model predicts and
experimental results confirm, a security agency such as the DHS or the Transportation Security
Agency must respond optimally to terrorist organizations’ actions and pre-empt any terrorist
attack by identifying terrorists within large groups of mostly innocent people. In this context,
profiling is rational and the government should actually screen individuals according to their
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Probability weighting has been used to explain overbidding phenomena in a verity of conflict games (Sheremeta,
2013).
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potential to be reliable recruits for the terroristic organization. The security agency should search
more often the individuals belonging to the most reliable categories with an apparently unfair
profiling practice. The intense search directed toward high reliability individuals should induce
the terrorists to send less reliable categories more often. Our findings should be interpreted with
caution, however, since our experiment does not shed light on the indirect effects of profiling,
e.g., the possible increases in a propensity for terrorist activity among groups being profiled
(Harcourt, 2007).
There are many possible avenues for future research. The general n-type version of the
model presented in section 2 also predicts misaligned profiling for the types that are reliable
enough (sufficiently high ri values) to be used in equilibrium, with a minimum reliability cutoff
that separates types that are used from those that are not. These predictions with n possible
attacker types could be compared with data. In particular, it would be interesting to see whether
high-reliability attack types are “over-defended” relative to the theoretical predictions in this
richer setting, as observed in the simple model with only two attacker types. In addition, it would
be interesting to investigate both theoretically and experimentally a non-constant sum version of
the profiling game, where each player can choose to attack (or defend) more categories at once
and the cost of attacking (or defending) is increasing in the number of categories attacked (or
defended). Another avenue would be to introduce multiple attackers and defenders, with
defenders trying to defend against multiple independent (or dependent) attackers. Also, it is
important to examine the problem of profiling in the setting of incomplete information, i.e., when
defenders and attackers know only the distribution of the reliability of each type. In such case,
players would need time and experience to learn how reliable different types are. These are all
very interesting questions and we leave them for future research.
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Appendix - Instructions






Rounds and Matching: The experiment consists of a number of rounds. Note: You will
be matched with the same person in all rounds.
Interdependence: Your earnings are determined by the decisions that you and the other
person make.
Roles: In each pair of people, one person will be given the role of "attacker" and the
other will be given the role of "defender." You role will be (attacker or defender) in all
rounds.
Locations: There are 2 locations that will be designated as: L1 and L2. An attack can be
targeted to either of these locations, and a defense can be augmented at either of these
locations.
Attack Success Probabilities: An attack will always fail at a site that is defended. An
attack at an undefended site may or may not succeed, and the probability of attack
success at undefended sites will depend on the site, as explained later.

Instructions (page 2)
Location:

L1

L2

Attacker Gain from Successful Attack:

$1.00

$1.00

Defender Loss from Successful Attack:

$1.00

$1.00

Position Your Asset




L1

L2

Attacker Gains: If an attack is successful at a location, the attacker earns an amount of
money shown in the Attacker Gain row of the table, for that location.
Defender Losses: A successful attack at any location results in a loss to the defender, as
shown in the Defender Loss row of the table, for that location.
Available Assets: Each attacker has 1 asset to allocate (1 attack), and each defender has 1
asset to allocate (1 defense).

Instructions (page 3)




Attack Outcomes: If a site is defended, an attack at that site will fail. The chances of a
successful attack at an undefended site depend on the site, as shown in the table below,
which will be reproduced for you when you submit your decision.
Location:

L1

L2

Probability of Attack Success at a Defended Site:

0

0

Probability of Attack Success at an Undefended Site:

0.67

0.33

Random Outcome Determination: Consider an attack on site L2. If this site is
defended, the attack will fail. If this site is undefended, the probability of attack success
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attack at that site is 0.33. You can think of this process as spinning a Roulette wheel with
stops labeled 1, 2, ... 100 and the outcome is a success if the wheel stops on a number that
is less than or equal to 33, so a probability of 0.33 corresponds to 33 chances out of 100
of attack success.
View Failed Attacks: After all decisions are made and confirmed, the defender will
always be able to see where an attack occurred, even if it fails.
Visibility of Defense Assets: The attacker will NOT be able to see where a particular
defense asset is located prior to making an attack decision.
Cause of Failed Attack: At the end of each round the attacker's results table will indicate
whether a site was defended or not. Thus if an attack does fail, the attacker will be able to
see whether it failed because the site was defended or because the attack at an
undefended site failed due to random causes.
Private Incomes: In addition to the earnings, losses, and costs that result from asset
allocations and attack outcomes, each person will receive a fixed income in each round.
Attackers and defenders may have different private incomes, which are not public
information. As a (Attacker or Defender), your income will be: $*.** per round.

Instructions (summary page)













There will be one or more rounds in this part of the experiment, and the final round will
not be announced in advance.
You will be matched with the same person in all rounds.
In each group, there will be 1 attacker and 1 defender.
Your role is that of ******
Defenders each have 1 asset to allocate across the 2 sites, and attackers each have 1 asset
to allocate to one of the 2 sites.
If a site is defended, an attack at that site will fail. The chances of a successful attack at
an undefended site depend on the site, as shown in the table below.
A successful attack at a site reduces the earnings for the defender, as indicated by the
Defender Loss for that site.
A successful attack at a site increases the earnings for the attacker, as indicated by the
Attacker Gain for that site.
The defender will always be able to see where an attack occurred in previous rounds,
even if it fails.
The attacker will not be able to see where a defense asset is located (before the attack
decision is made).
In addition, your payoff will be raised by an amount $*.** in each round, which is your
private income, not observed by the others with a different role.
Special Earnings Announcement: Your cash earnings will be 50% of your total
earnings at the end of the experiment.
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